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Introduction and Context
On December 10, 1976, a village leader1 of Saemaul Undong, Myeong-gyu Jeong 
triumphantly recounted how her village, Munjeong 2-ri, had more than tripled 
its per household income within a few years: “In 1972 my family began the 
cultivation of chili peppers… and now it has spread throughout the entire village 
reaching the size of a commercial farm.” She described how her village overcame 
hardship and cynicism to establish itself “as a cultivator of chili peppers” as well 
as tobacco. (Han 2013)
The Saemaul Undong (translation: “New Village Movement”) program in the 
1970’s was an initiative of the government of South Korea to partner with local 
villages in an effort to hasten economic development. The success of the program 
virtually eradicated rural poverty within a decade. Almost all villages nationwide 
managed to modernize local infrastructure and significantly increase household 
incomes, which, by 1976, grew to be 3.25 times as high as 1971 (Han 2012). 
Even more impressively, rural incomes would continue to increase, reaching 
10.35 times 1971 levels by 1981 (Han 2012). Remarkably, the modernization of 
rural infrastructure and the subsequent rise of income were primarily sustained 
by the efforts of villagers themselves (Han 2012). It was a comprehensive rural 
1 A village leader of Saemaul is one leading and strategizing the development in each village, and a village leader 
(without the Saemaul designation) is a leader who takes care of administrative affairs with local offices.
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development growth strategy that was fundamentally 
led at a grassroots level—villagers overcame rural 
poverty mainly through their own efforts (Han 2012). 
The government did, however, play a crucial role in 
incentivizing developmentalism in villages through a 
community conditional cash transfer (CCCT)2 strategy 
that was the centerpiece strategy of Saemaul Undong. 
Under CCCTs, cash transfers are only made to villages 
that meet set criteria, making transfers conditional upon 
the actions of the community.
Saemaul Undong is one of the best examples of 
CCCTs, and the goal of the Saemaul Undong CCCT 
was to encourage villagers to take the reins of their own 
village’s development. The strategy largely succeeded, 
leading South Korea’s mostly underdeveloped villages 
to become relatively prosperous and self-reliant within 
a decade.
Prior to the implementation of Saemaul Undong, South 
Korea experienced a period of rapid industrialization and 
economic growth that mainly enriched its urban centers. 
In the 1960’s, the Economic Planning Board3 had made a 
series of large-scale investments in the industrial sector 
and the urban areas that hosted industries. This created 
serious income inequality between urban and rural areas, 
leading to an exodus from the rural areas as villagers left 
to seek employment in urban areas. The unprecedented 
scale and chaotic nature of rural-urban migration placed 
a severe administrative burden on urban centers, Seoul 
in particular, and even threatened political and social 
unrest. (Brandt 1982)
This migration occurred despite the fact that 
following the Second World War, land-to-the-tiller 
reform programs had led to greater economic wealth 
and egalitarianism in rural areas, since owning private 
property created an incentive for increasing productivity 
(Reed 2010). Furthermore, investment in literacy led 
to high rural literacy rates that also enabled further 
productivity increases (Reed 2010). Yet, villager incomes 
languished.
The government implemented a number of programs 
aimed at improving rural incomes, with little success. 
Community development (CD) programs were 
introduced in 1958 by the Ministry of Reconstruction. 
Pilot villages were selected for the programs which 
followed the principles of CD by emphasizing cooperative 
and self-help development. In 1961, the movement for 
National Reconstruction was established to modernize 
people’s attitudes and special projects for Rural People’s 
Income Increase. The achievement of these various 
programs were modest. The government also established 
several agricultural institutions to support rural 
development (Brandt and Lee 1981; Reed 2010). One 
such institution was the government-sponsored rural 
cooperative, Nonghyup, which was established in 1961 
as an agency for purchasing and distribution, marketing, 
and for credit and government loans. The government 
set up an agricultural scientific and technological 
research body, the Rural Development Administration 
(RDA), which was founded in Suwon in April 1962. 
Investments were also made in irrigation expansion, 
mechanization, and in new varieties of rice with greater 
yields, along with fertilizers and other chemical products 
(Reed 2010). Investment in electricity and expanding 
transportation networks was also made a priority (Reed 
2010). The government also adopted a pro-agricultural 
pricing policy in the late 1960’s (Reed 2010). Despite the 
introduction of these policies, however, the 1960s saw a 
continued rural exodus and relatively stagnant villager 
incomes.
The historical social cohesiveness of Korean villages in 
and of itself failed to serve as a reliable foundation for 
the success of rural development initiatives (Han 2012). 
Even though villages had traditions of cooperative labor, 
they could not transition the traditions to modern forms 
of cooperation for income increase. Furthermore, by 
the 1960’s, individualism and the self-interest of rational 
actors were undermining traditional behavioral patterns 
of some cooperative enterprises in decision making. As 
an illustrative example, a village leader of Saemaul Jeong 
Munja (1975) recalls, “I heard that our village organized 
a youth volunteers’ organization that flourished for five 
years, but one of the leaders of that organization got a 
job in Seoul and ran off with the organization’s common 
fund… As a result, no one was motivated to join another 
organization.”
Favorable policies, investments in rural areas, and 
cooperative traditions largely failed to address rural 
poverty in Korea prior to the 1970’s. This case study 
explores how South Korea overcame rural poverty 
through CCCTs under the Saemaul Undong program. 
2 Under CCCTs, cash transfers are only made to villages that meet set criteria. 
Transfers are conditional upon the actions of the community.
3 An agency empowered by Korea’s government to design five-year economic 
plans to guide Korea’s government-led economic development. It merged with 
the Ministry of Finance in 1994 to form the Ministry of Finance and Economy 
(MOFE). As of 2017, The MOFE is The Ministry of Strategy and Finance.
SMU_CCCT 3-12-18 M.indd   2 3/12/18   2:44 PM
How to Use Community Conditional Cash Transfers and Inter-Village Competition for Rural Development, South Korea (1970–1979)GLOBAL DELIVERY INITIATIVE
3
First, the case study looks at some of the challenges 
experienced by rural South Korea during the 1970’s. Next, 
it examines how the CCCT strategy was implemented. 
Finally, it traces the adaptations made to the CCCTs 
to help villagers overcome the challenges they faced in 
achieving self-reliance.
The Development Challenge: 
Overcoming Rural Poverty
In the 1960’s, the majority of South Korea’s population 
was based in rural areas. In 1970, this figure stood at 
59.3% of the population.4 South Korea’s overwhelmingly 
rural population suffered from abject poverty. 27.9% of 
rural households lived in absolute poverty (Kwon 2010). 
This equaled approximately 5,548,000 people of South 
Korea’s total population of 32,240,000.5 Every spring 
rural areas would experience a period of food shortage 
that became symbolic of the chronic poverty of the 
time. Most villagers were low-income petty farmers who 
lived in thatched-roof houses with no electricity. They 
lived in villages that lacked adequate facilities, where 
poor infrastructure contributed to keeping productivity 
low and limiting sources of income. Villages typically 
lacked accessible roads, electricity, telephone lines, 
warehouses, modern bridges, and modern irrigation 
facilities. Infrastructure for comfortable living like 
modern housing, health facilities, and sewage systems 
were also absent. Alcoholism and gambling were rife, 
and an atmosphere of hopelessness, indifference, and 
cynicism was spreading and the central government 
was committed to eradicating that negativity through 
Saemaul Undong. Rural household income stood at slightly 
more than half that of urban households in 1969(Rho 2014).
Delivery Challenges: 
Improving Local Government 
Performance and Engaging 
Villagers
Prior to the implementation of Saemaul Undong there 
were attempts to alleviate rural poverty, but they were 
typically met with little interest from local government 
officials and villagers themselves. One notable example 
is the Community Development Program (CDP) that 
was established in 1957 by a subcommittee of the Korea-
USA Joint Economic Committee. Like Saemaul Undong, 
it was envisioned as a village improvement project that 
would be grassroots-led. Villagers were expected to 
assume responsibility for the planning and development 
of village projects. (Chung 1986).
The CDP grew from 12 pilot villages in 1958 to 818 
villages by 1961, with every county having one or two 
pilot villages. Community development workers were 
dispatched to pilot villages and it was hoped that pilot 
villages would inspire neighboring villages to launch their 
own development efforts. However, the development 
workers largely failed to engage villagers because they 
were seen as paid outsiders who had no real interest in the 
local community itself. The CDP operated until the late 
1960’s without any significant achievements, ultimately 
failing due to lack of interest from both local government 
officials and villagers, as well as the absence of a proper 
funding mechanism. (Chung 1986)
Two other significant attempts were the National 
Reconstruction Movement (1961–1964) and the “Special 
Project for Increasing the Income of Agrarian and Fishing 
Villages” (implemented in 1968). Both government 
programs were ultimately unsuccessful because they 
failed to engage villagers (Park 1981). Furthermore, 
government subsidies given to villages under the “Special 
Project for Increasing the Income of Agrarian and Fishing 
Villages” were largely ineffective (Park 1981). The same 
program also focused on individual farmers, neglecting 
the fact that even if individual household incomes 
increased, community problems would remain.
Four important lessons emerged from these failed 
programs. First, subsidies do not necessarily lead to 
income increase and can actually be harmful (Park 1981). 
Rather, it is important to have an effective and meaningful 
framework for subsidy provision. Second, the engagement 
of villagers is crucial to the success or failure of a rural 
development initiative (Han & Burmeister 2015). A 
bottom-up approach to development is necessary. Third, 
lack of interest and engagement from local government 
officials can have a detrimental impact on a rural 
development initiative (Han & Burmeister 2015). Local 
government officials needed to be incentivized to perform 
better. Fourth, rural development strategies should focus 
on the village unit (Han & Burmeister 2015). Household 
4 World Bank. n.d. (b).
5 World Bank. n.d. (a).
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incomes would be more likely to increase rapidly within 
a context of a village-wide cooperative effort (Han 2013).
In order to not repeat the failures of previous 
government programs, Saemaul Undong would have to 
address the following concerns:
How to Make Rural Development a Priority for 
Local Government Officials
Without the proactive involvement of local government 
officials, it would be difficult to enforce the CCCT 
mechanism of Saemaul Undong. Therefore it was 
necessary to motivate local government officials who 
could ensure that villages would be properly monitored 
and evaluated, and to protect the integrity of CCCTs 
through corruption controls.
How to Fund Rural Development
Nationwide rural infrastructure modernization could 
not be achieved through the efforts of government-
funded private construction contractors alone. Likewise, 
income increase would not be sustained through the 
mere provision of subsidies, such as price support 
measures. The financial burden of such an approach 
would be too great (Kim 2007). Productivity and income 
increase could only be sustained by villagers themselves. 
Crucial to this process was finding an innovative way to 
encourage villagers to attain sustained income increase 
through self-sustained measures. Measures for top-
down subsidization of a rural development project 
would not be viable if villagers did not contribute by 
taking the reins of the development effort, and it would 
be necessary for government to devise a model for 
self-funding that would allow villages to undertake 
their own development projects without any need for 
government assistance.
How to Create a Sense of Ownership and Self-
Reliant Villages
Engaging villagers to take active roles in their village’s 
development was a major concern following the failure 
of the CDP. Low villager participation could easily derail 
Saemaul Undong.
Proactive, visionary leaders would be needed to engage 
both their community and lead development projects. 
It proved important to have village leaders of Saemaul 
Undong who were motivated, competent, and accepted 
by their local communities, as they would need to 
motivate villagers to participate in the process of making 
villages self-reliant.
How to Promote Leadership and Assist 
Villages That Fall Behind
Finding and cultivating competent leaders to lead the 
Saemaul Undong initiative in the villages would be 
crucial. To accomplish this, the government needed to 
put together intense training programs for village leaders 
of Saemaul to build their knowledge and capabilities as 
agricultural entrepreneurs with the business capacity 
to increase rural household income. Village leaders of 
Saemaul from successful villages can act as role models 
to those from unsuccessful villages. They can teach them 
how to develop their own struggling villages.
Tracing the Implementation 
Process
Chronological Sequence of Actions 
Taken to Address Delivery Challenges
Broadly-speaking, Saemaul Undong’s implementation 
of CCCTs can be divided into three overlapping phases. 
Although the first and second phases had different 
targeted outcomes (i.e. infrastructure modernization 
versus income increase), income increase was the 
priority in both phases. Without any increase in 
incomes, Saemaul Undong would have failed to engage 
villagers. Saemaul Undong should thus be understood 
primarily as an income improvement program that 
sought to transform the village that sought to “harness 
cooperative traditions to enable villagers to undertake 
entrepreneurial endeavors to develop their villages and 
increase incomes” (Han & Burmeister 2015). CCCTs 
and training were adapted and implemented with this 
orientation throughout Saemaul Undong.
In phase one (1970–1973), the primary aim was to 
lay the foundations for income-generation projects. 
The improvement of basic rural infrastructure and 
administrative reforms in local government were 
important first phase elements. Village infrastructure 
improvement projects were critical for income increase. 
For instance, the expansion of roads allowed for easier 
access to, and movement around and within a village. 
Expanded roads enabled automobiles access to villages 
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and farming machinery was more easily transported 
around villages. This resulted in improved farming and 
household income increase. (Goldsmith 1981; Han 2013)
Infrastructure modernization and income increase 
could only be achieved through the active participation 
of villagers. Accordingly, the government provided 
villages with resources and introduced CCCTs during this 
phase to motivate village participation. Monitoring the 
results of these initial CCCTs showed clear and visible 
distinctions between successful and unsuccessful villages, 
thus stimulating inter-village competition. In 1970, all 
villages were provided with equal material support and a 
list of important infrastructure projects to pursue. Then in 
1971, villages were evaluated and only those that showed 
significant progress received further material support. 
The Saemaul Undong Leaders Training Institute (SLTI) 
was established in 1972 to improve village performance by 
training village leaders of Saemaul to engage villagers and 
manage projects. Public recognition of successful projects 
and the dissemination of their success stories was also a 
crucial component for encouraging villager engagement 
during this period. (Cheong 1981; Han & Burmeister 2015)
During the second phase (1974–1976), the priority 
shifted to implementing income-generating projects and 
constructing the appropriate advanced infrastructure for 
sustained income improvement. Income reinvestment 
projects (IRP) were introduced in 1973 as an adapted 
form of CCCTs for differentiated, performance-based 
support of self-reliant villages during the first phase. 
However, IRPs became the key funding mechanism 
during the second phase. IRPs were implemented at the 
time as a powerful instrument for self-sustained rural 
development.
The CCCT mechanism, however, not only served to 
reward successful villages, but it was also a means for 
the government to identify unsuccessful villages. This 
allowed the government to create appropriate policies for 
unsuccessful villages (Han & Burmeister 2015). Special 
measures were implemented in 1975 to train and support 
unsuccessful villages accordingly (Han & Burmeister 2015).
Phase three (1977–1979) was defined by the 
continued, broad-based efforts of government to 
expand the number of self-reliant villages. Increasing 
rural household income remained the priority during 
this phase. (Han & Burmeister 2015) This phase was 
also defined by projects that aimed to modernize 
infrastructure connecting rural villages, such as roads 
and bridges.
The evolution of CCCTs during this period is illustrated 
in [Table 1].
The government emphasized that the goal of Saemaul 
Undong and its CCCT framework was to increase rural 
household income (Han & Burmeister 2015). To achieve 
income increase, it incorporated the lessons of past 
failures. Accordingly, the government decided to base its 
new Saemaul Undong policy on interest-driven, voluntary 
participation. Participation would be encouraged by 
offering cash injections to villages through the CCCT 
framework. The government hoped this would lead to 
visible results that would encourage participation. A 
key aim of the program was to continuously improve 
the confidence, motivation, and skillset of villagers 
through visible results and by gradually increasing the 
complexity of Saemaul Undong projects. Ultimately, 
the aim was to make villages self-reliant by instilling the 
virtues of diligence, self-help, and cooperation (referred 
to as “development of the mind”). The following virtuous 
Table 1: Adaptive Implementation of Community Conditional Cash Transfers
Evolution of Saemaul Undong Community Conditional Cash Transfers
Year Period Community Conditional Cash Transfer (CCCT) Principle
Phase One 1st Year October 1970 – February 1971, 
(agricultural off-season)
CCCT 1 – Equal Distribution
2nd Year May 1971 – June 1972 CCCT 2 – Monitoring and Evaluation
2nd Year October 1971 – February 1972 CCCT 2 – Differentiated Support; Saemaul Leaders Training Institute 
established to improve village Saemaul leadership
3rd Year 1973 CCCT 3 – Systematic Monitoring and Evaluation for the classification of 
villages into village types (i .e ., ‘basic’, ‘self-help,’ ‘self-reliant’); Income 
Reinvestment Project introduced to ‘self-reliant’ villages .
Phase Two 5th Year 1975 CCCT 4 – Special education for less successful villages
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circle for Saemaul Undong was conceived as a means to 
instill the Saemaul Undong virtues and thereby increase 
productivity and income, (adapted from Han 2013; 
further illustrated in Figure 1):
1. Stimulation through government material support
2. Undertake small community projects
3. Gain experience
4. Observe visible results and benefits
5. Induce confidence and motivation for rural infrastruc-
ture renovation
6. Greater community participation
7. Cultivate the spirit of voluntary participation
8. Undertake larger community projects
The government’s rural development strategy relied on 
engaging villagers. The main instruments for community 
engagement utilized by government were CCCTs and 
village leaders of Saemaul. CCCTs would reward village 
development accomplishments and thereby stimulate 
inter-village competition. CCCTs included in-kind 
material transfers, contracts with government and 
presidential grants. These CCCTs served as sources of 
funding for successful villages. Crucially, the integrity 
of the CCCT framework could only be maintained by 
ensuring the active participation of local government.
Engaging Local Government
When Saemaul Undong was first implemented in 
1970, local governments were largely unprepared for 
playing a proactive role in local rural development. 
They traditionally deemed community development the 
responsibility of the central government (So 2013). At its 
introduction, Saemaul Undong thus faced the immediate 
challenge of making rural development a priority for 
local government officials.
The first step to facilitating rural development in South 
Korea was to reform the organizational culture of local 
government. A series of organizational policy changes 
were undertaken at the local government level with the 
aim of motivating local government officials to play a 
proactive, supporting role in rural development (Aqua 
1981). Whereas they were previously desk bureaucrats, 
local government officials were now to be incentivized 
to be out in the field communicating with villagers 
and monitoring Saemaul Undong projects. Reforming 
government-village power relations to encourage villager 
engagement required a transformation that would lead 
to development-oriented local government (Han and 
Burmeister 2015).
In achieving these aims, the government needed to 
incentivize local government officials and introduce 
a new system of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
that would promote a culture of mutual accountability 
between villagers and local government officials. This 
was executed with a ‘one public official for one village’ 
system (So 2013).
Under this system, the evaluation of local government 
officials was tied to village performance (So 2013). As 
a result, development activity by local governments 
was much greater than before (Brandt 1982). Linking 
individual reputation and promotion opportunities 
to village performance resulted in greater cooperative 
partnership between local government officials and 
villagers. Officials would no longer supervise projects 
from their desk, but undertake frequent on-site visits. 
They also received Saemaul Undong and capacity 
building for development training to help them to adjust 
to their new role. (Aqua 1981; Han and Burmeister 2015; 
Kim 2013).
The process of performance evaluation was kept 
transparent through periodic and continuous M&E of 
village progress by high-level officials. Officials from 
the Ministry of Home Affairs and other officials from 
the national, provincial, and local levels would typically 
visit villages more than once a month (Ministry of Home 
Affairs 1981; So 2013). The result was a multi-tiered M&E 
Figure 1: Action Plan of Saemaul Undong
Environmenttal Improvement Development of the Mind Increased Productivity and Income
Diligence • Self-Help • Cooperation
Source: Han and Burmeister 2015 .
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system of cross-checking that would monitor and evaluate 
the performance of both villages and local government 
officials. (Han and Burmeister 2015; So 2013).
Activating Villager Participation
Encouraging villager participation represented the most 
critical challenge for Saemaul Undong. The previous 
program for community development, the CDP had failed 
to engage villagers. It failed as a result and was absorbed 
into Saemaul Undong (Chung 1986). In response, the 
government devised a strategy for CCCT utilization that 
would incentivize villager participation.
CCCTs were implemented as follows.
(1) Providing Villages with Equal Opportunity
In the first year (1970–1971), Saemaul Undong was 
launched as the experimental Village Improvement 
Saemaul Project (also known as the Make-Saemaul 
Project). It was launched in the agricultural off-season 
when farmers were mostly idle. The primary aim of 
the CCCTs in the first year was to stimulate villages 
by providing them with resources. This distinguished 
it from regular village improvement projects (Han and 
Burmeister 2015). The government sought to emphasize 
the fairness of the Saemaul Undong’s CCCTs by giving all 
villages equal opportunity for development by providing 
them with equal resources (Han and Burmeister 2015). 
Each of 33,267 villages nationwide were provided with 
335 bags of cement and 0.5 ton of rebar for community 
development projects. Significantly, Saemaul Undong did 
not start with pilot projects (Han 2013). Villagers were 
free to undertake any project they chose. They were, 
however, encouraged by the government to consider 
projects from the following list of recommended tasks: 
(1) village hills reforestation; (2) broadening village 
access roads; (3) upgrading stream beds for embankment 
construction for flood prevention; (4) compost facility 
construction; (5) ditch dredging for drainage and other 
purposes; (6) communal well construction; (7) repairing 
sewage facilities; (8) constructing communal laundry 
facilities; and, (9) disposal of rats and other pests (Han 
2013; Han and Burmeister 2015).
In order to encourage villager participation, the 
government emphasized that projects should be decided 
by a village assembly according to a set of codified 
operation regulations (Han 2013; Han and Burmeister 
2015). This was done with the aim of promoting 
cooperation and self-reliance among villagers. Decision-
making power was given to communities to choose, 
plan, and implement projects. Leadership of a village’s 
development efforts was effectively transferred into the 
hands of villagers themselves. This policy innovation 
ensured a village-wide, inclusive democratic decision-
making process that empowered villagers.
The consensus-building village assembly, tasked with 
discussing project implementation strategies, was a 
key driver of participation and effective coordination. 
The institutionalization of village-wide democratic 
decision-making resulted in transparent and efficient 
documentation of the Saemaul Undong project selection 
and implementation process. The minutes and records of 
village assembly meetings as well as labor records that 
were maintained are a testament to this (Han 2012).
Alongside the village assembly, a village development 
committee (VDC) was designated as a steering body 
for village projects. The VDC would play a more 
executive role of recommending and selecting projects 
after receiving the consent of villagers. The VDC’s role 
included village development planning, overseeing the 
implementation of projects, and supervising various 
village organizational units. The VDC was comprised 
of up to 15 members, including the village leaders of 
Saemaul Undong, the village administrative head, and 
other influential villagers, such as the credit union chair 
and the youth assembly chair. Significantly, village leaders 
of Saemaul could be removed from their position by the 
community and replaced with another candidate, which 
actually did happen from time to time. (Han 2012; Han 
2013; Kim 2013).
The VDC was also tasked with maintaining records of 
resource usage and to provide frequent project progress 
updates to the village assembly (Han 2012). Furthermore, 
detailed logs of resource usage were kept. The receipt and 
utilization of resources also had to be verified through 
seals of the beneficiaries, the village leaders of Saemaul, 
and a local government official (Han and Burmeister 
2015). Both of these processes ensured transparency 
and the protection of the integrity of the CCCT system. 
Resource distribution and usage under the Saemaul 
Undong CCCT framework adhered to these processes, 
which worked to limit corruption (Han 2012). This in 
turn motivated better village performance.
The village assembly and VDC were collectively tasked 
with the cooperative utilization of resources for the 
improvement of the village environment.
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The five stages that characterized this phase are as 
follows (Han 2013; Figure 2 further illustrates this 
process):
1. Government stimulation of villages through material 
support
2. Village assembly selects what projects to undertake
3. Planning of details by village assembly
4. Cooperative implementation of the project
5. Visible results are highlighted to encourage confidence 
and motivate villagers to undertake new development 
projects
When villages were evaluated after a year, approximately 
50 percent of villages received positive evaluations, 
which amounted to 16,600 villages (Han and Burmeister 
2015). However, the results of the first year were not 
entirely satisfactory. In unsuccessful villages, villagers 
typically did not work cooperatively for the achievement 
of village improvement projects, but instead divided the 
cement and iron rods amongst themselves for individual 
projects. In some villages the cement was entirely unused 
and simply went to waste. Conversely, successful villages 
displayed strong cooperation between villagers and good 
leadership.
Analysis of the experimental period of Saemaul 
Undong revealed that the following three elements were 
important for success: (1) competent village leaders of 
Saemaul (Goldsmith 1981; Han & Burmeister 2015); (2) 
engagement of villagers (Han & Burmeister 2015); and 
(3) competitive allocation of government subsidies (Han 
& Burmeister 2015).
In response, the government made two important 
changes in the second year. First, it adopted a meritocratic 
policy of resource distribution. The CCCT system was 
adapted accordingly. Successful villages would receive 
additional resources for the continued improvement 
of their village environment. Second, it established the 
SLTI on January 14, 1972. Training for village leaders 
of Saemaul was prioritized as a means to improve the 
leadership skills of village leaders of Saemaul.6
(2)  Giving Differentiated, Performance-Based 
Support
In the second year, only the 16,600 villages that received 
positive evaluations after the first year were selected for 
an additional material subsidy of 500 bags of cement and 
one ton of rebar. This supplementary subsidy further 
bolstered the efforts of motivated villagers to be self-
reliant. The additional subsidies allowed them to make 
considerable progress in improving their basic village 
environment (Han and Burmeister 2015). In the second 
year, project selection and implementation took the 
following course (Han 2013):
1. Selection of the project by the villagers
2. Application for government’s material support
3. Detailed planning (including the amount of villagers’ 
input)
4. Cooperative work
5. Completion and follow-up
The successful transformations seen in the 16,600 
villages that received additional support encouraged half 
of the unsuccessful villages to carry out environment 
and infrastructure improvement projects with their 
own resources and without any governmental support 
(Han 2013; Han and Burmeister 2015). Inspired by the 
strong leadership role of the village leaders of Undong, 
these villages were motivated to catalyze and lead efforts 
that were guided by the popular sentiment, “Our village 
6 Korea Saemaul Undong Center. n.d.
Figure 2: Project Completion Process and Concomitant Feelings
Ignition
(Financial Support) (Project Selection) (Method Search) (Cooperative Efforts) (Proofs)
Village Meeting Action Plan Cooperative Work Project Completion
Sense of Achievement • Confidence • New Motivation
Source: Han and Burmeister 2015 .
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cannot fall behind the neighboring villages.” (Han 2013). 
The principles of diligence, self-help, and cooperation that 
successful villages internalized were thus disseminated to 
formerly unsuccessful neighboring villages. In this way 
CCCTs encouraged a competitive environment that 
capitalized on inter-village competition for development 
(Han 2013).
This dynamic was evident in the competition that arose 
between Jene-Ri Village and Seongdeok Village. Jene-Ri 
Village engaged in Saemaul Undong in 1971, but rested 
in 1972. Village Saemaul leader Se-Yeong Yi (2003, in Han 
2013) of Jene-Ri Village recalls, “After we took a break in 
1972 and looked around, neighboring villages and other 
villages had developed significantly and were transformed 
completely.” The neighboring Seongdeok Village had 
noticeably developed during that period (Han 2013). 
This prompted villagers of Jene-Ri Village to remark 
after witnessing their neighbor villages’ improvement on 
livelihood environment and increased income, “Look at 
Seongdeok, we should also do Saemaul project” (Yi 2010, 
in Han 2013). Yi says, his village resolved, “We cannot 
fall behind, we should engage in Saemaul Undong again” 
(2003, in Han 2013).
In 1973, motivated by the massive infrastructural and 
income improvement observed in Saemaul Undong 
villages, villagers were more motivated to participate 
in Saemaul Undong (Han and Burmeister 2015). And 
the government sought to strengthen Saemaul Undong 
by shifting the focus from basic village infrastructure 
improvement projects to cooperative income generation 
projects (Han and Burmeister 2015). This was because 
without sustained income increase, popular enthusiasm 
for Saemaul Undong would wane.
In 1973, in order to determine suitable, targeted village 
support measures for income increase, the Ministry 
of Home Affairs evaluated all villages nationwide and 
categorized them as basic, self-help (intermediate), 
or self-reliant (advanced) depending on their level of 
development, as illustrated by [Figure 3]. Set criteria 
were used for classification, as illustrated in [Annex A]. 
Likewise, projects were also divided into three types: 
basic, government-supported, and income-generation. 
This served the important function of ensuring the 
Saemaul projects were compatible with the capabilities 
and priority areas of a village.
Giving targeted, meritocratic support to villages 
consolidated the CCCT mechanism of Saemaul Undong 
of prioritizing support for successful villages. As a result, 
the credibility of the CCCT system was established.
The CCCT system’s credibility motivated villagers 
to cooperate for village improvement by guaranteeing 
support for successful villages. Village Saemaul leader 
Mu-Hong Yang recounts (in Han 2013):
“Contrary to our will, our village was not funded by the 
cultivation project of 1972. Not being discouraged, at a 
village assembly meeting we resolved to press on with the 
electricity project on our own. We all could witness the 
outcome of self-help and cooperation when on the day the 
construction of the electric infrastructure was completed, 
264 households were provided with bright light, all thanks 
to 13 million KRW in support, which was comprised of six 
million KRW raised by 53 village people and a loan of seven 
million KRW. Highly appreciated by the regional province 
and local Council, in 1973 our village was elevated to the 
status of a ‘self-help village’, drawing benefits from the 
Saemaul Undong and raising morale.”7
Mu-Hong Yang’s Sinpung-Ri Village was recognized as 
a self-help (intermediate) village in 1972 after it managed 
to secure electric power on its own, without government 
support. It subsequently received material support 
from the government in 1973. It used these materials to 
construct a village hall and entrance road. (Han 2013).
(3)  Consolidating Income Increase Measures 
for Sustainable Development
In 1974, the government formally marked Saemaul 
Undong’s transition from the “Groundwork Foundation 
Period” to the “Self-Help Growth Period” (Han and 
7 The nominal exchange rate was 398.3 South Korean Won (KRW) per 
United Stated Dollar (US$) in 1973 (Nam and Kim 1999); 6,000,000 KRW = 
US$15,064.02; 7,000,000 KRW = US$17,574.69.
Figure 3: Village Types
Basic 18,415 Self-Help Village 13,943 Self-Reliant Village 2,307
Source: Han and Burmeister 2015 .
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Burmeister 2015). Even greater emphasis was placed on 
projects that lead to income increase. This marked a clear 
turning point for future development projects in villages 
(Han and Burmeister 2015).
Villages were encouraged to make the transition to self-
sustained community funding for village development. 
Creating a culture of saving and investing in villages was 
prioritized. CCCTs were modified to promote such a 
culture. The income reinvestment project (IRP) modality 
was initially introduced in 1973 within this context as a 
mechanism for sustained income increase for self-reliant 
villages. There were approximately 4,000 self-reliant villages 
by the end of 1973. Self-reliant villages were awarded IRPs 
to help them make this transition. From the case of Chulpo-
Ri village, the process of receiving and applying CCCTs can 
be explained as following a series of steps (Han 2013):
1. Successful Saemaul project implementation in 1972
2. Designated as self-reliant village
3. Receive self-reliant village award money
4. Invest in income generating projects
5. Receive presidential award money
6. Engage in IRP
IRPs essentially functioned as a public-private 
partnership (PPP) that created jobs for villagers and 
ensured that they were the direct recipients of the wages 
associated with a project. The IRPs had two main goals: 
(1) rural household income increase and (2) village 
development fund growth. The village development fund 
was a community credit cooperative that was introduced 
with IRPs for investments in village income increase 
projects. (Han 2012)
Instead of providing construction projects to 
companies, the government decided to rely on the 
capacity of self-reliant villages to successfully implement 
projects as part of the IRPs. The government intent was 
to foster developmentalism at the villages. Villagers 
implement development projects. On behalf of villagers, 
the Village Development Committee (VDC) becomes ‘a 
co-op type of company’ led by the leaders as well as the 
villagers. The VDC, as a business entity, signed a business 
contract with the government. Accordingly, the VDC 
was compelled to take responsibility for the completion 
of IRPs by being held legally accountable as a result of 
entering into a business contract with government.
Under the framework of IRPs, the government 
awarded villages with small-scale construction projects 
valued at less than three million KRW (US$7,532.01 in 
1973). The government also stipulated that half the wages 
earned by villagers through the project should be saved 
in a village development fund. This helped to promote 
a culture of saving. The village development fund was 
to be run according to shareholder principles and to 
be specifically used for future investments in income-
generating projects. The village development fund was 
managed in the same way as a stock company with 
division of profits determined by the amount invested. 
Villagers who invested more were thus guaranteed to get 
a greater share of the profits. A matching fund principle 
was utilized as the foundation of the government-
approved IRP projects, which asked villagers to invest 
some into the village development fund. Government did 
not award contracts valued at more than three million 
KRW (US$7,532.01) because it believed such contracts 
would be too complex for villagers. Annex B outlines the 
framework of IRPs (Han 2012; Han 2013).
Figure 4 provides a concrete example, even though it 
is not from a real village, but hypothetical. In the Figure 
4 case study, the government bestowed an initial grant 
for a small creek project for better irrigation and flood 
control. It was assumed that the ratio of labor cost to 
material cost would be 6:4. Thus, the VDC spent 40 
percent of the government grant on operational costs 
and the purchasing of materials; 60 percent of the fund 
was allotted to labor costs. From the labor income, half 
was saved for the establishment of a village fund. In this 
hypothetical case study, the village fund was established 
at three million KRW (US$7,532.01). This fund was 
utilized for reinvestment in other income generating 
projects. The village decided to initiate chestnut seedling 
farming as its first IRP. This project added results in 
an initial windfall of 3,024,000 KRW (US$7,592.27) 
and the village fund grew to 4,512,000 million KRW 
(US$11,328.14).
Self-reliant villages were awarded with contracts, 
thereby continually raising their incomes through 
reinvestment of their profits. Through repeated 
application of IRPs, villages could eventually achieve 
sustained income increase without government support. 
By stipulating that the village fund was only meant for 
income-generating projects, the government guaranteed 
the establishment of a virtuous cycle of income increase. 
The IRP thus introduced four important developmental 
components for income increase. First, it distributed the 
profits of government construction projects directly to 
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villagers. Second, it allowed the village development fund 
to grow, which gave self-reliant villages the means to 
invest in income-generating projects. Third, it served as an 
effective corruption control mechanism by emphasizing 
transparency and accountability. The VDC that served as 
the project implementation committee was accountable 
to not only the government, but also the village assembly. 
Fourth, it provided villagers with work experience that 
would further instill the principles of diligence, self-help, 
and cooperation (Han 2012; Han and Burmeister 2015).
Presidential and government grants were also awarded 
to successful villages as another form of CCCT to fund 
community development projects in ‘self-reliant’ villages. 
Chulpo-Ri Village’s experience is illustrative of the entire 
process of CCCT obtainment and application. It benefited 
from both a presidential grant and IRPs that served as 
employment-creating PPPs for income reinvestment for 
future income-improvement project generation.
Chulpo-Ri Village was awarded a government grant 
on February 1, 1973, after it achieved the status of a 
self-reliant village. The prize money was worth 1.2 
million KRW (US$3,012.80) (Han 2013), which was a 
substantial amount at the time. Villagers at the village 
assembly decided to use the grant to fund various village 
development projects, including cattle farming, creek 
reclamation, clam farming, roof renovation, and tree 
planting. For the cattle farming project, part of the fund 
was used to lend money for livestock purchase to farmers 
who wanted to engage in cattle farming but had no cattle. 
The farmers were expected to repay these loans in-kind 
(Han 2012).
The same village was also granted a contract from 
the government for a creek improvement project. The 
contract outlined the following specific terms and 
conditions (Han 2012):
●● Project amount: 277,000 KRW (US$695.46)
●● Project period: April 27, 1973 – May 31, 1973
●● Village provided a two-year warranty for their work 
(June 1, 1973 – June 1, 1975)
Figure 4: Example of Income Reinvestment Project
Government Investment
10 million KRW
Total Effect
20 million KRW 10 million KRW 10 million KRW
Business Effect Income Effect
Villager’s Income
3 million KRW
Village Fund
3 million KRW
Contracted Village Project
10 million KRW
(Assumption)
Small Creeks Project
Investment: 10 million KRW
Ratio: Labor (60) Material (40)
1st Income Reinvestment Project
Chestnut Seeding Farming
3 million KRW
Nursery Trees 9,934,920
6,024 million KRW sold
Operation Cost
3 million KRW
Net Profit
3,024 million KRW
Village Saving
1.512 million KRW
Principal Capital
3 million KRW
Expenditure of
Materials
4 million KRW
2nd Income Reinvestment 
Project Fund
4.512 million KRW
Distribution of Profit
1.512 million KRW
(Villager’s Income)
(Repetition)
• Speeding Farming
• Cow Raising
• Pig Raising
+
+
+=
Source: Han 2012 .
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As a precondition, the VDC had to guarantee the quality 
of the work, effectively holding the VDC accountable 
to the local government and its fellow villagers alike. 
After successfully completing the project, the village 
was awarded another 1.2 million KRW (US$3,012.80) 
presidential grant on October 24, 1974. A village assembly 
meeting followed where villagers discussed how to use the 
presidential grant. It was decided to use the grant under 
the framework of the IRP to initiate new income increasing 
ventures. Approximately 88 percent of all household heads 
in Chulpo-Ri Village participated. (Han 2012).
IRPs evidently developed the capacity of villages to engage 
in self-directed development and grassroots innovation 
for income increase, without the need for government 
support. Having an embedded democratic decision-making 
process in villages was a critical component for ensuring 
transparent, accountable, self-directed development that 
satisfied the needs of villagers at large.
The meeting minutes kept by Gwangmuk Im, village 
leader of Saemaul Undong for Chulpo-Ri Village, reveals 
the process of an empowered village assembly utilizing 
CCCTs for village income improvement projects in 
order to gain additional CCCTs. The meeting minutes 
of October 24, 1974, include discussion on securing 
an Income Reinvestment Fund, (see Annex C), and on 
determining the projects where the Income Reinvestment 
Fund would be invested, (see Annex D). Both illustrate 
this process of independent decision-making. The process 
of independent decision-making was also evident in the 
grassroots innovations seen in villages.
Importantly, village Saemaul leaders and fellow villagers 
had to continuously introduce grassroots innovations 
independent of government support in order to help their 
villages qualify for additional CCCTs by meeting income 
increase targets. In order to qualify for a governmental 
grant or an IRP, an average household income of 1.4 
million KRW (US$3,514.94) was required to be classified 
as a self-reliant village.
In the case of Chulpo-Ri Village, the village embarked 
on a land reclamation project that was much larger and 
ambitious than other Saemaul projects (Han 2013). Two 
businessmen had failed in the 1960’s to reclaim the land, 
yet in 1971 the villagers decided to undertake a land 
reclamation project as a Saemaul project, despite having 
no government support (Han 2013). They failed twice and 
were frustrated when parts of the dam were destroyed, but 
by using very rudimentary and poor tools such as A-frame 
carriers and handcarts, they managed to successfully 
complete the project (Han 2013). The government did 
not respond to their requests for assistance, yet the 
villagers and village Saemaul leader were able to reclaim 
the land from the sea. As a result, farming opportunities 
were improved. And the villagers successfully established 
an oyster farm in the sea to increase their income. After 
Chulpo-Ri Village’s achievement was recognized by 
the government, the provision of electricity to Chulpo-
Ri Village was prioritized (Han 2013). The policy of 
electricity prioritization to successful villages drew great 
envy from neighboring villages while increasing the pride 
of villagers. The government had a policy of supplying 
electricity and telephone services to successful villages, 
which was intended to both stimulate competition and 
allow those villages to undertake additional projects.
Despite these achievements, the village achievements 
of Chulpo-Ri Village ranked only 4th in the local county 
of Dangjin (Han 2012). This underlines the extremely 
competitive nature of Saemaul Undong. The system of 
CCCTs that awarded resources to a limited number of 
villages depending on their ranking and achievements 
thus encouraged fierce inter-village competition. This 
accelerated rural development and encouraged creative 
innovation at the village level (Han 2013), while further 
bolstering competition.
Many Saemaul Undong projects were implemented by 
villagers themselves without government assistance. The 
experience villagers gained in running, implementing, 
and completing IRPs and adapting grassroots innovations 
gave them the necessary experience and sense of 
self-reliance to continuously undertake successive 
and variegated projects for further income increase. 
Villager-initiated village Saemaul banks, consumer 
cooperatives, agricultural cooperatives, and grocery 
stores were established to consolidate this process and 
further stimulate the village economy and stimulate a 
culture of saving and investment, leading to impressive 
transformations in some cases. For example, the formerly 
impoverished village of Jibuk saw household incomes 
increase greater than sevenfold, and assets in the village 
increase from a negligible amount to over 33 million won 
($829.14) (see Table 2).
IRPs and creative innovation for income increase 
highlight the leading role of villagers in Saemaul Undong. 
It was essentially a process of village-led development, 
spurred by government stimulus. Government played 
an important supporting role, but Saemaul Undong was 
driven at the grassroots level.
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(4)  Selecting and Training Transformational 
Leaders
Village Saemaul leaders were instrumental to the 
processes involved in village infrastructure and 
income improvement. They played the important roles 
of motivating villagers and also overseeing project 
implementation. Furthermore, village Saemaul leaders 
made numerous innovations for income increase 
themselves. The government was at times hesitant to 
support projects it saw as “too ambitious” or “too risky,” 
stipulating that such projects should be avoided by 
villages. Saemaul village leaders were described by Kim 
Yeong-Mo in 2003 (in Han, 2013) as “imaginative and 
democratic leaders.” They were also entrepreneurs with 
the business capacity to successfully implement profitable 
Saemaul Undong projects.
(a) Selection
Prior to Saemaul Undong, professional community 
development workers were dispatched to villages under 
the National Reconstruction Movement (1962–1971). 
Yet, villagers were very reluctant to follow them since 
they were outsiders, unilaterally chosen, and paid 
professionals. Villagers were unable to empathize with 
them and questioned their sincerity (Han 2013).
Under Saemaul Undong, the government thus decided 
to ask villagers to nominate members of their own 
community for village Saemaul leader positions (Han 
2013). It was decided that these leaders would be unpaid, 
and elected as volunteers so that they could act as an 
inspiration to fellow villagers. Having village Saemaul 
leaders who could connect, communicate, and share a 
sense of unity with villagers was an important means to 
engage villagers. Kim Gi-myeong (2009, in Han, 2012), 
a professor at the Saemaul Leadership Training Center, 
recalls that:
“I think the biggest motivation came from the fact 
that Saemaul Leaders were the same as any other 
resident in the village and they volunteered to lead 
without pay. So people thought ‘Hey we can’t just 
watch. We need to help our village leader. The 
leader is putting aside their own work to take on 
various village tasks. We can’t ignore our village 
Saemaul Leader.’ Next thing they know everybody 
is participating. This dynamic process is very 
important.”
Government typically favored the election of energetic 
persons in local communities to be trained as village 
Saemaul leaders. Government emphasized a rural 
development policy of discovering and nurturing not 
only excellent farmers, but also people with leadership 
potential (Han 2013). At an earlier stage, the government 
realized that by only selecting candidates from a pool of 
outstanding farmers for training, the potential impact 
of Saemaul Undong would be limited. Therefore, 
government encouraged the nomination of individuals 
who had not only a strong agricultural background but 
strong leadership skills (Han 2013). To reflect this change, 
the name of the central training institute was changed 
from ‘Advanced Farmer Training Center’ to the ‘Saemaul 
Leaders Training Institute.’
(b) Training
Leadership was identified as the key variable determining 
the success of a village within the Saemaul Undong 
framework (Goldsmith 1981). Although leaders were 
fellow community members, in many unsuccessful 
villages people often felt indifferent and even cynical 
towards Saemaul Undong. This represented a real threat 
to the sustainability of Saemaul Undong as a nationwide 
community-based growth strategy that was heavily 
dependent on villager participation. Leadership training 
was thus emphasized as a means to standardize Saemaul 
Undong as a growth strategy in villages nationwide.
Although CCCTs could drive the strategy of 
competitive incentivization, it was still necessary to have 
competent village Saemaul leaders who could persuade 
villagers to participate and expend significant energy and 
make personal sacrifices for the sake of their community’s 
development. Village Saemaul leaders needed to 
proactively engage with their community and oversee 
the transformation of their village. CCCTs could only be 
Table 2:  Rise in Household Income and Growth 
of Village Fund in Jibuk Village, 
1971–1979
1971 1979
Assets of the 
Village Fund
23,000 33,568,000
Household 
Incomes
245,000 1,839,000
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs 1979 .| Unit: KRW .
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effective with development-oriented leaders who could 
persuade villagers to take it seriously. Village Saemaul 
leaders were needed to share the vision of Saemaul 
Undong with villagers and show them the potential gains 
from participation.
As a result, the SLTI was established in 1972 along with 
many other training centers nationwide with the purpose 
of increasing the quality of leadership at the village level. 
The SLTI served as the most important and influential 
locale for training. The education and training programs 
were practical in nature and incorporated successful case 
study analysis, peer teaching, life story sharing, and group 
discussions. Trainees stayed in on-site dormitories and 
were cut off from the outside world for the duration of 
their training. This was done for the purpose of delivering 
a profound, intensive, and immersive pedagogical 
experience and to ensure the absolute dedication of trainees 
while instilling a sense of pride and belief. The SLTI aimed 
to transform ordinary farmers into agricultural CEOs 
and emphasized practice over theory. This underscored 
the importance of ‘learning by doing.’ Saemaul business 
practice and practical leadership as well as attitudinal 
training were key components of the curriculum. The 
curriculum was designed to equip village Saemaul 
leaders with the skills to plan and execute community 
projects and run their village as a communal company or 
cooperative enterprise. Village Saemaul leaders were also 
taught leadership and social skills to engage and persuade 
villagers to participate. These leaders were to serve as 
role models of achievement who could inspire fellow 
villagers into action. Some described the training, which 
targeted attitudinal change, as being so thorough and life-
changing a program that it was akin to a ‘blasting furnace’ 
or a ‘charcoal kiln.’ Village Saemaul leaders were essentially 
taught the skills to manage a village as a company. A 
sample curriculum is outlined in Annex E. Technical skills, 
including construction technology competence, were also 
taught by the Rural Development Administration (Han 
2013; Han and Burmeister 2015).
Village Saemaul leaders needed to possess strong 
communication skills, in addition to entrepreneurial, 
accounting, organizational management, and agricultural 
skills (Han 2013). The training they received imparted a 
strong entrepreneurial mindset, which was conducive to 
grassroots innovation. Having village Saemaul leaders with 
strong entrepreneurial skills and the business capacity 
to oversee the implementation of successful Saemaul 
Undong projects was crucial to the success of Saemaul 
Undong as a growth strategy. Village Saemaul leaders 
also needed to possess the ability to build consensus and 
coordinate village development and communication as 
well as inspire unity. Two integral components of the 
training they received were the integration of storytelling 
where leaders learned to effectively share success stories 
of overcoming poverty as a persuasive technique. Visits 
to successful villages to review successful projects were 
also incorporated into the training (Han 2012). Group 
discussions formed as important part of training, and 
the following topics were typically discussed: Desirable 
Leadership Types, Ways to Increase Income, Increasing 
Residents’ Motives for Participation, Developing the 
Village Credit Cooperative, and My Plan to Implement 
Saemaul Undong (Han and Burmeister 2015). Continuous, 
scheduled correspondence would take place between 
the director and village Saemaul leaders following 
training (Han and Burmeister 2015). Following a survey 
of Saemaul leaders from 36 villages, trainees indicated 
that the most helpful training components were mental/
attitudinal training (42.5 percent) and presentations of 
success stories (20.3 percent) (Hwang 1980).
Nevertheless, village Saemaul leaders faced many 
challenges in persuading villagers to participate in 
Saemaul Undong, particularly in cases where villagers 
were expected to donate land (Han and Burmeister 2015). 
The basic principles of Saemaul Undong, such as visible 
results for motivation, and the leadership skills taught to 
village Saemaul leaders at the SLTI were instrumental 
to overcoming these difficulties. They often had to use 
different techniques to persuade villagers. Notably, 
village Saemaul leaders could not solve all of the village’s 
problems on their own and had to function within the 
context of the VDC as part of a leadership team. However, 
their importance as dynamic and adaptable agents of 
change cannot be understated (Han 2013).
One illustrative case of these challenges was that of 
village Saemaul leader Chang-Gyu Jeon’s village roof 
improvement project. His village needed to tear down 
ten houses and build them anew for roof improvements. 
The houses were too shoddy to support a modern roof. 
This particular project occurred over a two-year period 
and required plenty of persuasion. Jeon (2008, in Han 
2012) recalls:
“Even when they claimed not to oppose it, that was 
a lie. I would visit once, twice… twenty times until 
they would agree. Villagers would say things like, 
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‘You’re just like a leech that won’t let go.’ . . . I used 
to say, ‘If we intend to farm, we’ll have to carry out 
the Saemaul Undong. So, we’ll have to widen the 
roads and improve the walls and the roofs too. We’re 
going to need a lot of materials.’ ‘I guess you’ll have 
to donate some of your land.’ . . . I’d start with the 
land of owners who had moved into the city. After 
observing the donation of former villages in cities, 
villagers finally joined this donation drive.”
Village Saemaul leader Yeong-Mo Yu (2008, in Han 2013) 
said he implored his fellow villagers, “Our Cheongpung-
Myeon [a sub-county] consists of 27 villages. How can 
we be the last place out of those 27? I started from there. 
I united them first and started working seriously in 1973.”
As such narratives show, by building the capacity of 
village Saemaul leaders, the government facilitated villager 
participation. Village Saemaul leaders were imbued with a 
faith in developmentalism and trained to be entrepreneurs 
who had the business capacity to carry out projects 
for income improvement. They differed significantly 
from traditional village heads, who possessed purely 
administrative responsibilities. Once villagers experienced 
modest success in completing such projects, bigger and 
more ambitious projects would be developed. As village 
performance improved, they gained more support from 
government through CCCTs. Importantly, village Saemaul 
leaders were not just passive messengers of government 
policies, but were trained to proactively implement 
Saemaul Undong (Han 2013). They adapted government-
sponsored projects to local conditions. They also at times 
undertook projects without the consent of government. 
For instance, Dongmak Village undertook the following 
projects without government support: chestnut tree 
farming, cattle farming, pig farming, construction of a 
barn, and water pipe installation (Han 2013).
(5) Womens’ Empowerment
During the Saemaul Undong, every village had two 
village leaders of Saemaul Undong: one male, the other 
female. In light of lower status of women in rural Korea, 
the establishment of women leadership is remarkable. 
Female village leaders also received modern training to be 
village leaders. These trained leaders led mainly women’s 
Saemaul Undong through women’s associations. Active 
participation of women was indispensable for the success 
of Saemaul Undong. Women and their female leaders 
were very active in the campaign of anti-gambling and of 
women’s economic advancement. Additionally, women 
developed credit cooperatives, savings movements, 
consumer cooperatives, and cooperative income projects 
during Saemaul Undong. Although they were referred to 
as so-and-so’s wife or mother before, through Saemaul 
Undong female village leaders of Saemaul Undong 
became public figures.
(6) Leaving no Village Behind
The purpose of the CCCT system was not only to 
reward successful villages. It also served to differentiate 
successful and unsuccessful villages in order to diagnose 
the problems unsuccessful villages faced. Through 
continuous M&E, the government could customize its 
policies to take a more targeted approach in supporting 
struggling villages (Kim 2013). The Saemaul Undong 
education programs offered by the SLTI and other 
institutes served as the main government support for 
unsuccessful villages (Kim 2013). This policy became 
especially pronounced from 1975.
Successful villages were used as dynamic educational 
case studies nationwide to train village Saemaul 
leaders from unsuccessful villages. Prior to being sent 
to advanced villages, village Saemaul leaders from 
unsuccessful villages would undergo a week’s preliminary 
training at the SLTI. Typically, three to six leaders from 
unsuccessful villages would stay in a successful village for 
a period of three nights and four days to observe the best 
practices of successful Saemaul villages. These successful 
villages would typically be similar to their own villages in 
term of geographical conditions and economic activities. 
The host village Saemaul leader would prepare a detailed 
program schedule with themes such as ‘Business 
project introduction and description,’ ‘Environmental 
renovation project,’ ‘Income Reinvestment Projects,’ 
‘Income generating projects,’ ‘Explaining the roles of 
the various village organizations,’ and ‘Create long term 
plans for village development (by trainee).’ Trainees were 
expected to write a detailed evaluation following their 
visit, answering prompts such as (1) What especially 
impressed me?, (2) What should our village do? (3) What 
do I wish to do after returning? and (4) What did I learn? 
This served as an opportunity for village Saemaul leaders 
to benchmark more successful villages. This training had 
a follow-up stage as well. After leaders from unsuccessful 
villages returned to their villages and applied what they 
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had learned, leaders from self-reliant villages would visit 
unsuccessful villages to evaluate their progress (Han 
2012; Han 2013; Han and Burmeister 2015).
Furthermore, the sharing of success stories and the 
associated know-how served as another important 
mechanism to assist unsuccessful villages. Stories of 
poor villages achieving prosperity and of poor farmers 
becoming relatively wealthy portrayed the ultimate goal 
of Saemaul Undong. The success story of Sa-Yong Ha, 
a famous village leader of Saemaul Undong, became a 
national sensation and was dramatized into a film called 
The Light in a Prairie (1971). Individuals such as Sa-Yong 
Ha were requested to lecture at the SLTI and at various 
other training institutes nationwide (Han 2012).
To further inspire unsuccessful villages and successful 
villages alike, the Ministry of Home Affairs published an 
annual magazine entitled, Saemaul Undong.8 Some of 
the cases were presented at the National Convention of 
Saemaul Leaders and received medals of commendation 
from the president of Korea. Government thus stimulated 
competition through formally recognizing successful 
villages (Han 2012).
These measures alongside the CCCT incentivizing 
system and the training of village Saemaul leaders 
resulted in the mass engagement of villagers nationwide, 
as illustrated in Annex F.
Development Outcomes
Within a decade more than 5.5 million villagers were 
lifted from absolute poverty, rural infrastructure was 
modernized, and the annual rural household income 
increased from 255,800 KRW (US$642.23) in 1970 to 
2,275,000 KRW (US$5,711.78) by 1979—an increase 
of 771% within a decade. Significant improvements 
were made in the provision of basic services, notably 
sewage systems and electrical power, along with road 
infrastructure and communication. This represented a 
significant improvement in rural living conditions. Tables 
3 and 4 and Annex G highlight the impact of Saemaul 
Undong.
Lessons Learned
Fostering Government-Villager 
Partnership
A paradigm shift took place in South Korea in the 1970’s 
with regard to power relations between government 
officials and villagers. The central government sought to 
establish a platform for rural development by improving 
the competency of local governance institutions and 
by implementing important reforms that prioritized 
rural development. A key part of this process was 
ensuring, through performance-based evaluations, that 
local government officials would actively engage rural 
communities. This paradigm shift signaled the formation 
of a new type of farmer-government relationship by 
changing the very nature of government officials and 
empowering villagers. The positive government-villager 
8 It was published from 1973–1979.
Table 3: Composition of Villages by Level by Year, 1972–1979
Year
End Total
Self-reliant Village [Advanced] Self-help Village [Medium] Basic Village [Low]
Number of 
Villages Percentage [%]
Number of 
Villages Percentage [%]
Number of 
Villages Percentage [%]
1972 34,665 2,307 7 13,943 40 18,415 53
1973 34,665 4,246 12 19,763 57 10,656 31
1974 34,665 7,000 20 21,500 62 6,165 18
1975 35,031 10,049 29 20,936 60 4,046 11
1976 35,031 15,680 45 19,049 54 302 1
1977 35,031 23,322 67 11,709 33 — —
1978 34,815 28,701 82 6,114 18 — —
1979 34,815 33,893 97 976 3 — —
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, “10 Year History of Saemaul Undong .” 1980 .
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partnership that existed helped village Saemaul leaders to 
present the Saemaul Undong vision and promote Saemaul 
Undong projects at a grass-roots level. Cooperative 
partnerships between local government and village 
Saemaul leaders were critical to ensuring localization. 
(Han 2013).
Empowering Local Communities by 
Using Inter-Village Competition-Based 
Differentiated Support
Saemaul Undong is notable for engaging stakeholders 
at the local level. By emphasizing democratic decision-
making and voluntary participation, the government 
encouraged villager participation and interest in 
Saemaul Undong (Han 2013). Villages were tasked, first, 
with improving their infrastructure and, second, with 
increasing their income. Democratic decision-making 
provided the means for the successful implementation 
of development projects. By fostering a learning 
environment, villagers could learn from project failures 
and gradually cut dependency on government for project 
support. The localization of development efforts was 
essential to the success of Saemaul Undong.
Connections, communication, and unity between 
villagers were much more important than government 
policies and orders. Unity and cooperation between 
villagers cannot be created through the backing of 
government alone. Presenting and sharing a vision is 
critical. In the case of Saemaul Undong, this vision was 
founded on a developmentalist platform that prioritized 
improving living conditions and increasing income. 
Saemaul Undong was a socio-economic growth strategy 
with practical aims that sought to overcome fatalism 
and dependency in villages through the tools of self-
help, diligence, and cooperation. It was not an ethical 
movement that sought to engage villagers through slogans 
and theories. It was a growth strategy that underscored 
the importance of actual project implementation (Han 
2013). Successful village Saemaul leaders embodied 
Saemaul Undong’s core principles, which can be defined 
as ‘the great transformation of farming-for-subsistence, 
to agriculture-for-making profit.’ (Han 2013)
This ‘great transformation’ occurred by providing 
incentives for infrastructure improvement and income 
increase through CCCTs. Providing communities with 
resources and rewarding successful ones stimulated the 
development process as well as inter-village competition. 
This grassroots engagement mechanism was a crucial 
aspect of Saemaul Undong.
As a result of the grassroots nature of Saemaul 
Undong, participants at the village level were able to 
promote entrepreneurial spirit among themselves, 
overcoming a cynical atmosphere toward despair as they 
solved community problems. The government achieved 
behavior change in villages by instilling the principles 
of diligence, self-help, and cooperation by training and 
supporting local leaders and incentivizing villages local 
Table 4:  Average Annual Household Income of Rural Farmers and Urban Workers, 1970–1979 
 (thousands of KRW)
Year
Rural Farmers (A) Urban Workers (B) Difference
Income per 
household
Percent  
Increase
Income per 
household
Percent  
Increase A–B A/B %
1970 255 .8 28 381 .2 39 (125 .4) 67 .1
1971 356 .4 39 451 .9 18 (95 .5) 78 .9
1972 429 .4 20 517 .4 14 (88 .0) 83 .0
1973 480 .7 12 550 .2 6 (69 .5) 87 .4
1974 674 .5 40 644 .5 17 30 .0 104 .6
1975 872 .9 29 859 .3 33 13 .6 101 .6
1976 1,156 .3 32 1,151 .8 34 4 .5 100 .4
1977 1,432 .8 24 1,405 .1 22 27 .7 102 .0
1978 1,884 .2 32 1,916 .3 36 (32 .1) 98 .3
1979 2,227 .5 18 2,629 .6 37 (402 .1) 84 .7
Source: Economic Planning Board and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, in ADB, 2012 | Unit: KRW .
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public officials through the mechanism of inter-village 
meritocratic CCCTs.
By empowering rural communities through CCCTs, 
the government could use CCCTs to encourage villagers 
to innovatively use the resources at their disposal to 
achieve development targets, and thereby qualify for 
and further benefit from government support. This 
process encouraged self-reliance in villages. Changing 
the behavior of rural households was at the heart of 
Saemaul Undong and its emphasis on locally-driven 
development. Saemaul Undong, through CCCTs, 
effectively transformed villages into business units.
Fostering Village Entrepreneurial 
Leaders with Business Capacity 
Building
The government identified and trained talented 
individuals as village leaders of Saemaul Undong. 
Female village leaders were also elected and trained. 
Village leaders of Saemaul Undong were intermediaries 
between villages and government. Additionally, they 
also took charge of local Saemaul Undong projects. 
Villagers were included as stakeholders in this process, 
and were expected to nominate the leaders who would 
undergo training. Through CCCTs and training, the 
government empowered enterprising Saemaul leaders to 
encourage their own rural communities to participate in 
development-oriented cooperative projects.
Furthermore, female village leaders of Saemaul Undong 
greatly enhanced village development efforts. They were 
particularly helpful in fostering a culture of saving by 
actively combating cultures of gambling and alcoholism 
(Han 2012).
Preventing Community Failure
The government took active measures to ensure that 
villages with unsuccessful results on initial projects were 
not abandoned by the Saemaul Undong program. Village 
Saemaul leaders received adequate training to prevent such 
failure and CCCTs were used to motivate unsuccessful 
villages. Study visits and other important tools were used 
to support and build the capacity of the village Saemaul 
leaders of unsuccessful villages. Local government officials 
also were required to carefully monitor and evaluate 
villages in order to report difficulties.
Relentless Focus on Villager Outcomes
Throughout the implementation and adaptation of 
Saemaul Undong’s CCCT mechanism there was a focus 
on how villagers would benefit. CCCTs were always 
implemented and adapted with a view as to how they 
would lead to rural infrastructure modernization and 
income improvement. Visible results were important 
in highlighting Saemaul Undong’s villager-orientation. 
Saemaul Undong gained legitimacy in the eyes of 
villagers as a pro-village growth strategy as a result of its 
strong focus on villager outcomes. As a result, villagers 
participated and achieved self-directed development 
mainly through their own grassroots efforts.
Adaptive Implementation
The government realized the need to change the culture 
of rural development initiatives. It sought to transform 
village culture by emphasizing local-level decision-
making capacity and also sought to effect a similar 
transformation in bureaucratic culture at the local 
level. By devolving authority over project selection and 
implementation to the grassroots-level, as represented 
by the empowerment of village assemblies, projects 
in villages could be adapted to local conditions and be 
customized to address local needs and concerns. This 
led to greater efficacy and efficiency, improved public 
official and villager accountability, and allowed for a 
flexible, iterative approach to project selection and 
implementation, as was evident in the gradual increase 
in the difficulty of projects year-by-year.
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Annex A: Criteria for Classification of Villages
Project
Required Factors
Self-help Village Self-reliant Village
1 . Farm Roads • Completion of village roads • Completion of main road to village
• Improvement of village roads • Construction of bridges less than 20 meters
2 . Housing Environment • Roof renovation for 70% of village houses • Roof renovation for 80% of village houses
• Embankment of creeks • Fence-remodeling for 80% of village houses
3 . Farming Base • Farmland Irrigation: over 70% • Farmland irrigation: over 85%
• Reclamation of streams in villages • Reclamation of streams surrounding villages
4 . Cooperative Life • Must have one or more of the following: 
community hall, warehouse, workshop, etc . 
• Must have two or more of the following: 
community hall, warehouse, workshop, etc . 
• Total assets in village development fund must be 
over 500,000 KRW
• Total assets in village development fund must be 
over 1 million KRW
5 . Income Projects • Must have one or more community income 
creation project
• Creation of non-farming income project
• Average annual income per household: over 
800,000 KRW
• Average annual income per household: over 1 .4 
million KRW
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, “10 Year History of Saemaul Undong .” 1980, in Kim 2013 .
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Annex B: Income Reinvestment Project Framework
Government Grant
Compound Project
• Village seeding farming
• Cow breeding
• Pig raising
• Land reclamation
Villager’s Income
Village Fund
Village Contract of Seeding Farming
Profit (Labor)
Village Contract
Profit (Labor)
Distribution of Profit
(50%)
Village Saving
(50%)
Village Saving
(50%)
Distribution of Profit
(50%)
Source: Han 2012 .
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• Date: October 24, 1974
• Location: Village Office
• Participants: 82 persons – (blank) male, (blank) female (Village General Assembly)
• Contents of Discussions
Discussion on securing Income Reinvestment Fund:
1 . 205 of the total construction cost should be secured for the Income Reinvestment Fund .
2 . In order to secure the Income Reinvestment Fund, 25% of the daily wages shall be deducted before paying the rest to the 
participating workers .
3 . However, the money collected for the Income Reinvestment Fund shall be reinvested into a business project that will improve 
the residents’ welfare; such a decision shall be passed by the village General Assembly . The breakdown of the Income 
Reinvestment Fund is as follows: men 820 x 25/100 (won), women 530 x 25/100 won .
4 . Total construction cost: 1,200,000 won
(Signatures) As representatives of the village residents, the Village Development Committee members sign and seal this document .
Source: Gwangmuk Im . 1974 . “Meeting Minutes (Oct 24, 1974) .” Gwangmuk Im, the Leader . The Saemaul Undong DB, The Saemaul Undong Central 
Training Institute, Seongnam, Republic of Korea .
Annex C:  Meeting Minutes for Securing Income Reinvestment 
Fund, October 24, 1974
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• Date: December 31, 1974
• Location: Village Office
• Participants: 72 persons – (blank) male, (blank) female (Village General Assembly)
• Contents of Discussions
Determination of a business project into which the Income Reinvestment Fund will be reinvested:
1 . This village shall reinvest the Income Reinvestment Fund into oyster farm repair project .
2 . The fund shall be used to supplement stones and reorganize the pre-existing oyster farm, which is 20 ha .
3 . Further details of the business plan shall be created by the Village Development Committee .
(Signatures) As representatives of the village residents, the Village Development Committee members sign and seal this document .
Source: Gwangmuk Im . 1974 . “Meeting Minutes (Dec 31, 1974) .” Gwangmuk Im, the Leader . The Saemaul Undong DB, The Saemaul Undong Central 
Training Institute, Seongnam, Republic of Korea .
Annex D:  Meeting Minutes for Securing Income Reinvestment 
Fund, December 31, 1974
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Annex E:  The Curriculum of the Saemaul Leaders Class  
(2-Week Course)
Subject
Title General Subjects – course titles are examples only Hours
Development of the Spirit of Saemaul ‘Basic Mentality for Rural Modernization’, ‘How Long Should We Live Like 
This?’, ‘Elevation of Cooperative Spirit’
32
Maintaining Autonomous Local Order ‘Public Social Order’ 2
Farm Leadership Skills ‘The Attributes of Leaders for Saemaul Undong’ 6
Special Subjects
Village Improvement Project ‘Farm Road Development’, ‘Basic Construction Skills’ 11
Saemaul Practice ‘Roof Improvement’, ‘Operating Agricultural Equipment’ 11
Income Increasing Projects ‘Farm Specialization Project’, ‘Cash Crop Production Increase’ 11
Cooperatives ‘Farmers’ Cooperatives’, ‘Farm Managers in Cooperatives’ 5
Successful Case Stories ‘Village Improvement’, ‘Farm Roads’ 15
Group Discussions ‘Group Discussions ’ 18
On-Site Training ‘Office of Rural Development and Advanced Saemaul Village’ 6
Miscellaneous Subjects
Miscellaneous ‘Physical Ed’, ‘Events’, ‘Evaluation’ 20
Source: Han and Burmeister 2015 .
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Annex F:  Village and Villager Participation in Saemaul Undong, 
Year by Year
Year Villages Total People (approximately) Average Number of Participants Per Village
1971 33,267 720,000 22
1972 34,665 3,200,000 92
1973 34,665 6,928,000 200
1974 35,031 10,685,200 305
1975 36,547 11,688,000 320
1976 36,557 11,752,800 322
1977 36,557 13,719,300 375
1978 36,257 27,092,800 747
1979 36,271 24,207,800 667
Source: So 2013 .
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Project Unit
Target (set in 
1971)
Progress by 
1979
% of 
target
Expansion of village roads km 26,266 43,506 165
Pavement of farm roads km 49,167 61,201 124
Construction of small bridges number 76,749 76,195 99
Village assembly hall dong (regional unit) 35,608 35,950 101
Storage house dong (regional unit) 34,665 21,792 63
Workspace number 34,665 5,755 17
Animal stalls number 32,729 4,352 13
Small reservoirs number 10,122 13,079 129
Dikes number 22,787 29,131 128
Waterways km 4,043 4,881 121
Small river arrangements km 17,239 9,180 53
Housing improvements 1,000 dong (regional unit) 544 185 34
Community resettlements villages — 2,102 —
Beautification of small towns small towns (do, eup) 1,529 748 49
Portable water supply number 32,624 23,764 73
Sewage systems km 8,654 14,758 170
Electrification of farming and fishing villages 1,000 households 2,834 2,777 .5 98
Village communication ri, dong (regional unit) 18,633 18,633 100
(administrative villages and towns) ri, dong (regional unit) (36,313) (24,633) (68)
Magnetic telephone facilities circuit/cable line — 345,240 —
Saemaul factory factories 950 666 70
Village reforestation ha 967,362 569,804 59
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, “10 Year History of Saemaul Undong .” 1980 .
Annex G:  Village Living Environment and Infrastructure 
Improvement, 1970–1979
SMU_CCCT 3-12-18 M.indd   25 3/12/18   2:44 PM
How to Use Community Conditional Cash Transfers and Inter-Village Competition for Rural Development, South Korea (1970–1979)GLOBAL DELIVERY INITIATIVE
2 6
Bibliography
Aqua, Ronald. 1981. “Role of Government in the Saemaul 
Movement.” Toward a New Community Life (Man-
Gap Lee, ed), Institute of Saemaul Undong, Seoul 
National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea.
Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2012. “The Saemaul 
Undong Movement in the Republic of Korea: Shar-
ing Knowledge on Community-Driven Development.” 
Sharing Knowledge on Community-Driven Develop-
ment in Asia and the Pacific, Asian Development Bank, 
Manila, Philippines.
Brandt, Vincent. 1982. “Local Government and Rural 
Development.” Studies in the Modernization of The 
Republic of Korea: 1945–1975, Council of East Asian 
Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
Brandt, Vincent and Man-gap Lee. 1981. “Community 
Development in the Republic of Korea.” Community 
Development: Comparative Case Studies in India, 
the Republic of Korea, Mexico and Tanzania (Ronald 
Dore and Zoë Mars, eds), UNESCO (United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), 
Paris, France.
Cheong, Ji-Woong. 1981. “Information, Education, and 
Training in the Saemaul Movement.” Toward a New 
Community Life (Man-Gap Lee, ed), Institute of 
Saemaul Undong, Seoul National University, Seoul, 
Republic of Korea.
Chung, Ki-Hwan. 1986. “A Model Comparison between 
the Community Development Program and the 
Rural Saemaul Undong in Korea.” Journal of Rural 
Development, 9(December): 201–218.
Goldsmith, Arthur. 1981. “Popular Participation and 
Rural Leadership in the Saemaul Undong.” Toward a 
New Community Life (Man-Gap Lee, ed), Institute of 
Saemaul Undong, Seoul National University, Seoul, 
Republic of Korea.
Han, Do Hyun. 2012. “The Successful Cases of the Korea’s 
Saemaul Undong (New Community Movement).” 2011 
Modularization of Korea’s Development Experience, 
Knowledge Sharing Program, Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security, Korea Saemaul Undong 
Center.
Han, Do Hyun, with Hwajin Song and Christian Joon 
Park. 2013. “Village Leaders and Their Community 
Activities.” New Research on Saemaul Undong: Lessons 
and Insights from Korea’s Development Experience, 
2012 Modularization of Korea’s Development 
Experience, Knowledge Sharing Program, KDI School, 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Korea Saemaul 
Undong Center.
Han, Do Hyun and Larry L. Burmeister. 2015. “The Saemaul 
Movement: A Sourcebook.” The Academy of Korean 
Studies Press, Seongnam City, Republic of Korea.
Hwang, In-Jeong. 1980. “Integrated Rural Development 
in Korea: Evaluation of the Rural Saemaul Undong and 
its Perspective.” The Journal of Korea Rural Economic 
Institute, Vol. 2.
Kim, Joon-Kyung, with KS Kim. 2013. “Why the Saemaul 
Undong is So Important to Understanding Korea’s 
Social and Economic Transformation.” New Research 
on Saemaul Undong: Lessons and Insights from Korea’s 
Development Experience, 2012 Modularization of 
Korea’s Development Experience, Knowledge Sharing 
Program, KDI School, Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance, Korea Saemaul Undong Center.
Kim, Shin-Haing. 2007. “Finance and Growth of the 
Korean Economy from 1960 to 2004.” Seoul Journal of 
Economics, 20(4): 377–418.
Korea Development Institute. 1975. “Korea’s Economy: 
Past and Present.” Seoul, Republic of Korea.
Korea Saemaul Undong Center. n.d. “History.” Seongnam 
City, Republic of Korea. http://www.saemaul.or.kr/eng/
aboutSMU/history (Accessed on 29 October 2016).
Kwon, Huck-ju. 2010. “Implications of Korea’s Saemaul 
Undong for International Development Policy: A 
Structural Perspective.” The Korean Journal of Policy 
Studies, 25(3): 87–100.
Nam, Sang-Woo and Se-Jong Kim. 1999. “Evaluation of 
Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy.” Changes in Exchange 
Rates in Rapidly Development Countries: Theory, 
Practice, and Policy Issues (Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. 
Krueger, eds), University of Chicago Press.
Park, Jin Hwan. 1981. “Process of Saemaul Undong Project 
Implementation in Korea.” Toward a New Community 
Life (Man-Gap Lee, ed), Institute of Saemaul Undong, 
Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea.
Reed, Edward P. 1981. “Village Cooperation and the 
Saemaul Movement: Perspectives from a Case Study.” 
Toward a New Community Life (Man-Gap Lee, 
ed), Institute of Saemaul Undong, Seoul National 
University, Seoul, Republic of Korea.
SMU_CCCT 3-12-18 M.indd   26 3/12/18   2:44 PM
How to Use Community Conditional Cash Transfers and Inter-Village Competition for Rural Development, South Korea (1970–1979)GLOBAL DELIVERY INITIATIVE
2 7
Reed, Edward P. 2010. “Is Saemaul Undong a Model 
for Developing Countries Today?” International 
Symposium in Commemoration of the 40th 
Anniversary of Saemaul Undong, 30 September, Korea 
Saemaul Undong Center, Bundang City, Republic of 
Korea.
Rho, Wha-Joon. 2014. “Triple Helix for Social Innovation: 
The Saemaul Undong for Eradicating Poverty.” Journal 
of Contemporary Eastern Asia, 13(1): 39–55.
So, Jin Kwang. 2013. “Reforming Governments for 
Saemaul Undong.” New Research on Saemaul 
Undong: Lessons and Insights from Korea’s 
Development Experience, 2012 Modularization of 
Korea’s Development Experience, Knowledge Sharing 
Program, KDI School, Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance, Korea Saemaul Undong Center.
World Bank. n.d. (a) “Population, total – Republic of Korea.” 
World Bank Open Data, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL 
(Accessed on 27 October 2016).
World Bank. n.d. (b) “Rural population (% of population) 
– Republic of Korea.” World Bank Open Data, World 
Bank, Washington, DC. http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS?locations=KR (Accessed 
on 27 October 2016).
In Korean
Im, Gwangmuk. 1974. “Meeting Minutes (Oct 24, 1974).” 
Im Gwangmuk, the Leader. The Saemaul Undong 
DB, The Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute, 
Seongnam City, Republic of Korea.
Im, Gwangmuk. 1974. “Meeting Minutes (Dec 31, 1974).” 
Im Gwangmuk, the Leader. The Saemaul Undong 
DB, The Saemaul Undong Central Training Institute, 
Seongnam City, Republic of Korea.
Jeong, Munja. 1975. “Women of Oryu Village.” The Way 
to Saemaul: The Report on the Inspection of Japan’s 
Agricultural Industry and Successful Case Stories. 
Saemaul Leaders Training Institute, Seongnam City, 
Republic of Korea.
Ministry of Home Affairs. 1980. “Saemaul Undong 
10  nyonsa [10-year history of Saemaul Undong 
movement].” Seoul.
Yi, Se-Yeong. 2003. “Saemaul Undong in Pungdeok-ri: 
Biography of Saemaul Award Recipient Se-Young Yi.” 
Seoul: Munhwa Printing.
Oral Recordings In Korean
Oral Recording of Chang-Gyu Jeon. 2008. “Transcript 
of Oral Recording of the Saemaul Undong Leader: 
Chang-Gyu Jeon.” Han Do-Hyun, The Academy of 
Korean Studies, Seongnam City, Republic of Korea.
Oral Recording of Gi-Myeong Kim. 2009. “Transcript 
of Oral Recording of Gi-Myeong Kim in the Oral 
Archives of the Saemaul Undong I-V.” Democracy 
Archive, Sungkonghoe University, Seoul, Republic of 
Korea.
Oral Recording of Se-Yeong Yi. 2010. “Transcript of Oral 
Recording of Se-Yeong Yi in the Oral Archives of 
Saemaul Undong.” Democracy Archive, Sungkonghoe 
University, Seoul, Republic of Korea.
SMU_CCCT 3-12-18 M.indd   27 3/12/18   2:44 PM
How to Use Community Conditional Cash Transfers and Inter-Village Competition for Rural Development, South Korea (1970–1979)GLOBAL DELIVERY INITIATIVE
2 8
KDIS
KDI School of Public Policy and Management was established in 1997 to educate and develop the next generation 
of leaders in today’s rapidly changing and globalizing economy. The School offers an innovative educational program 
focusing on policy and international issues and aims to transform mid-career professionals into leaders of their respective 
fields by equipping them with new knowledge, vision and a global perspective. KDI School also draws from a wealth of 
research and resources from the Korea Development Institute (KDI), Korea’s leading economic think tank, to share the 
nation’s unique development experience with the global community.
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